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JIM PAUL: Good morning again and welcome to this symposium on 
managing Hawai 'i' s trust doctrine. My name is Jim Paul, and I'm a member 
of the committee that has been working on pulling this program together 
today. 
We are privileged to have with us two of the most widely respected and 
well-known people in the United States, with respect to the public trust 
doctrine, Prof. Joseph Sax and Mr. Jan Stevens, whom you will be hearing 
from shortly. We are also privileged to have with us today, as I'm sure all of 
you here know, a very wide and very remarkable cross section of Hawai 'i' s 
leaders and people who are very interested in this doctrine. Most of you, as 
you know, have played a role in some way, some small and some very large, 
in the cases and in the development of this doctrine and where it is today. We 
have a very interesting array of perspectives from different points of view 
about the doctrine and what it means to people who are in some way 
responsible for dealing with it and implementing the doctrine. 
The catalyst for this symposium was the August, 2000 Waiiihole Ditch 
decision. 1 Several interested parties who are involved in that case believed 
that a gathering such as this was essential to focus on the public trust doctrine 
and specifically that doctrine as it has now been established by that decision 
in Hawai'i. By coincidence, both of our speakers today, Prof. Sax and Jan 
Stevens, are quoted by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in that decision. We hope 
by the end of today that all of us here will have a better understanding of 
certain issues, such as just what is Hawai 'i' s public trust doctrine, who is 
responsible for managing and implementing that doctrine, what are the 
specific responsibilities of the state and its subdivisions and agencies, what 
does it mean on a day-to-day basis for regulators, policy makers and managers 
of the state, and why is it supportive of and consistent with many of the native 
Hawaiian and native American notions of the relationship between human 
beings and natural resources. 
It is now my pleasure to introduce Prof. Denise Antolini, who will introduce 
our keynote speaker for the day, Prof. Joseph Sax. Denise is an assistant 
professor at the William S. Richardson School of Law, here at the University. 
She is very active in the law school's environmental program and has been 
very active, not only in this law school, but also in previous lives in 
environmental issues across this state and elsewhere. She was at the birth, if 
I can call it that, of the Waiiihole case, a long, long time ago, but not too far 
I In re Water Use Permit Applications, Petitions for Interim Instream Flow Standard 
Amendments, and Petitions for Water Reservations for the Waiahole Ditch Combined Contested 
Case Hearing, 94 Hawai'i 97,9 P.3d 409 (2000) [hereinafter "Waiahole"]. 
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away, when she represented the Waiahole-Waikane Community Association 
and others when this case became a contested case hearing before the water 
commission. Perhaps most importantly, she was a student of Prof. Sax's in his 
first year at the University of California, Berkeley, and she is looking forward 
to introducing him today. 
DENISE ANTOLINI: Aloha and good morning. Especially in Hawai "i, water 
is life, and rain, literally and figuratively, environmentally, culturally, and 
economically, is a blessing. The Hawaiian word for water, "wai," is a 
beautiful word used to describe so many special places with special sources 
of water like Waiahole, Waikane, and Waianu. The importance of water to 
Hawaiian culture is evident in the term "waiwai," which means wealth and 
"kanawai," which means law. 
Yesterday, I had the great privilege of accompanying Prof. Joseph Sax and 
his wife Ellie, and Jan Stevens and his wife Karen on a tour of the Waiahole 
water system and stream. The morning was very gray and very rainy, 
circumstances that might have dampened the spirits of a less intrepid group of 
travelers, but Joe, Ellie, Jan, and Karen were not only, as you might guess, 
very experienced travelers, but each of them has visited Hawai'i many times 
over the past thirty years. So as we began driving up the Waiahole Valley 
Road into the mist-shrouded Pali, I think they all knew we were in for an 
unforgettable Hawaiian adventure. 
Suddenly, we had a view between the dripping trees of the stunningly steep 
cliffs ringing the back of Waiahole Valley. The spectacular sight of a 
symphony of gushing waterfalls plunging down the Pali took our breath away. 
As we climbed up the rough road to the tunnel, it quickly became evident to 
me that, yesterday, the day that these very special people came to visit it, 
Waiahole stream was spectacularly high, perhaps at record levels, and the 
roaring sound was phenomenal. It was a chicken skin experience. 
So why do I relate this story to you as a way of introducing Prof. Joseph 
Sax? For three reasons. First, to me the rain was a sign of blessing for their 
visit to Hawai'i. I hope they continue to enjoy every minute of it and to come 
back often. Second, the full and wild stream was a tribute, in my mind, to Joe. 
Without knowing it, and in a far away place that he probably never knew he 
would visit, and as a result of scholarship that he began over thirty years ago, 
his wisdom and passion had a real, positive, immediate, and breathtaking 
impact. Yes, like so many of you in this room who had some role and a little 
something to do with the restoration of Waiahole stream, Joe was partially 
responsible for the fact that that stream was gushing and not trickling. The 
third reason is that Joe and his lifetime of scholarship reminds me of the 
vitality, the purity, the wealth, and the blessing of our water in Hawai'i. For 
more than four decades, his contributions to law teaching, legal scholarship, 
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and public policy have been like those waterfalls; incredibly prolific, 
sometimes unexpected, always enriching, fluid, inviting, and powerful. He 
has authored over eight books and over a hundred articles on law and public 
policy that are listed in your bibliography in the areas of endangered species, 
citizen suits, environmental impact statement law, property law, takings, 
public lands, especially national parks, and, of course, water law and the 
public. His life of teaching and scholarship has touched so many lives, lives 
of people he never knew and probably will never meet--<lecades of students, 
advocates, communities, decision makers, and litigators, and most 
importantly, he's touched the 'iiina. 
From my experiences, first as a student of his the first year when he arrived 
at Berkeley, then as a public interest litigator, and now as a law teacher 
teaching environmental law , I am very grateful to him for his pioneering work, 
especially in the areas of citizen suit litigation and water law. Joe is 
recognized throughout the country as one of the founding fathers of modem 
environmental law , not just the public trust doctrine. He's not only a lawyer's 
lawyer, but, in my view, he's a scholar's scholar. He makes a difference. His 
biography is summarized in your materials but let me highlight for you what 
other nationally recognized scholars themselves have said about Joe Sax. 
In 1998, there was an extraordinary panel of scholars from across the 
country at an annual conference of the American Association of Law Schools 
in San Francisco, and I was lucky enough to be able to go to this panel 
discussion of five or six distinguished scholars, all there to talk about the 
scholarship of Joe Sax. And what a tribute it was. The room was packed. 
The convener of that panel, Richard Lazarus from Georgetown University 
Law Center, said this about Joe: 
If one were to ask legal scholars to name the two or three most significant natural 
resources law scholars of modem times, Prof. Joe Sax's name would be on 
everyone's list. Extraordinarily engaging in person, he is even more so in his 
legal scholarship. He presents a rare combination of passion and intellect. He 
has, in his own work both as a teacher and a scholar, demonstrated the positive 
attention for bridging academic scholarship and law reform. He has been a 
mentor, a model, and indeed, an inspiration of many of those who teach and 
practice natural resources law today. 
He is a historian, a multi-disciplinarian, an inventor, a tinkerer, a fIrst-class 
lawyer with a passion and a vision. Also known as the "dean of water law," 
he is a master of rhetoric, he's a populist, he's an optimist. Prof. Sax, thank 
you again for coming to Hawai'i. We thank you for inspiring us, for educating 
us, and for your creative and pragmatic approach to environmental law in the 
public interest. Aloha and welcome. 
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PROFESSOR SAX: Water is unique among resources and it's not unique 
simply because it sustains us, though, of course, it does that. Unlike other 
resources, unlike land, oil, or timber, which are also essential to our modem 
lives, water, whether we find it beneath the earth or in surface streams, is a 
moving and a cyclical resource. Its supply is uncertain and changeable from 
season to season and from year to year. By its very nature, it is a shared 
common property. We cannot command it as a fixed object as we do with 
land or with other minerals. The water we use today is not the same water 
we'll use tomorrow, and the water we use is routinely used again and again by 
someone else downstream or downgradient, and ultimately water returns to the 
sea. It is a continuum. Surface water and underground water are parts of a 
single integrated system. For these reasons, the legal regime applied to water 
is unlike any other, and this has been true in every state and in every nation 
and at all times. Water is never owned in the usual sense. We acquire only 
use rights in it, or what lawyers call a "usufruct." Because water is inherently 
a common resource, it is subject to common servitudes, such as the right of 
public navigation. We find these concepts in various forms in all legal 
systems, not only those familiar remnants of the ancient Roman law that 
underlie the modem public trust doctrine, which restricts privatization of the 
sea and the seashore, but also, for example, in Spanish law, some elements of 
which are still operative in the American Southwest. 
One such concept is the pueblo right which establishes a common 
entitlement to water for the benefit of the whole community, or pueblo, and 
which therefore limits the ability of anyone to vest in themselves private rights 
in such water. You might be surprised to know that the City of Los Angeles 
is a pueblo and that even today it holds pueblo rights in the Los Angeles River 
and in the ground water in the San Fernando Valley tributary to the Los 
Angeles River. Similarly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Spanish 
communities in America constructed community ditches, or acequias, which 
members of the community were obliged to maintain, and such facilities are 
still found and maintained in places like rural New Mexico. Irrigation projects 
in early Indian communities in the Southwest were also community and not 
individual efforts. All these diverse laws from widely separated places on the 
globe emphasize one idea: Water is first and foremost a community resource 
whose fate tracks the community's needs as time goes on. 
Water law evolves in the common law tradition. Public trust law is 
common law founded on community water rights. Public trust law evolves to 
meet community needs. But public trust law is only one instrument in this 
more general world. In western water law, a whole panoply of distinctive 
rules apply to water, all of which insulate it in greater or lesser degree from 
ordinary commodification. While one can acquire these so-called usufructory, 
or use rights as property rights in water, and while they are constitutionally 
2001 / PROCEEDINGS: PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 25 
protected property rights, they can only subsist so long as they are for 
beneficial use, only for the amount that's needed for that beneficial use, only 
to the extent the water is not wasted, and only so long as the need remains. 
One cannot hold water without using it merely as an investment, and non-use 
triggers forfeiture statutes that will return unused water to the public. These 
are the general principles of water law. 
In more humid regions where riparian law prevails, the central public 
precept of water law is that rivers belong to the place where they arise. 
Traditional riparian law pennits use only to those whose land borders the 
water, and it prohibits water from being taken out 6f the watershed of origin 
for use. Moreover, riparian doctrine traditionally restricted diminution of 
natural flows, holding that the values of a river must be protected for each 
successive resident and for the downstream community. While some of these 
rules have given way in light of contemporary water needs, it is a striking fact 
that elements of the riparian doctrine's communitarian ideology has been 
making a strong resurgence in many places in the arid west. 
Watershed protection and restoration, which has recently emerged as a new 
environmental goal, is as old as the English common law of riparian rights and 
natural flow. A number of western states, among them Colorado, Montana, 
and California, have versions of so-called "area of origin" laws. These laws 
implement policies that are designed to assure access to native waters for 
those communities in which waters originate, as against the fully commodified 
market property approach to water and water rights. 
There's one other feature of water law that reveals its essential status as a 
common resource. I've already referred to its evolutionary character that 
pennits it to adapt to meet the changing needs of the community that depends 
upon it. Because water is so central to the life of a community of which it is 
a part, water law has shown itself to be remarkably adaptable to the evolving 
needs of the community. Some of these transformations are well known. In 
pre-industrial England and America, as I mentioned just a moment ago, the 
natural flow doctrine prevailed. Rivers were left to flow as they did in the 
state of nature, which suited agricultural and pastoral landscapes prior to the 
Nineteenth century. As industrialization got under way, most prominently 
with the mills that powered the early industries of New England, natural flow 
doctrine yielded to a more industry-friendly doctrine known as "reasonable 
use." The law changed to pennit the diversions to produce hydropower, and 
natural flow doctrine gave way, though versions of it are making a strong 
comeback in the context of environmental restoration. 
Similarly, the unique business needs of the timber industry in the upper 
Midwest, the lumber that built places like Chicago, demanded a revised 
definition of navigable water, one of the keystone concepts of traditional 
water law. Except during the winter when they could be skidded across the 
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snow, the only way to get the great white pine logs to market was by floating 
them down the rivers. But only waters where tides ebbed and flowed and 
where ships went carrying freight were traditionally navigable public 
highways. So the courts revised the notion of navigability and narrowed the 
rights of private land owners along these streams in the Midwest by 
determining that a river could be navigable even if it was not affected by the 
tides, and even if its suitability for commerce was measured by the movement 
of lumber and not by ships. This is another classic example of the common 
law's judicially led evolution to accommodate the public and public trust right 
in navigation. 
As population moved west past the hundredth meridian, the line dividing 
the so-called humid and arid regions of North America, another and even more 
dramatic change occurred. Riparianism, the very essence of water law in 
Anglo-American tradition, was simply not recognized in most of the West. 
Instead, western states fashioned the prior appropriation system which, among 
other things, abolished watershed of origin restrictions, and permitted water 
to be moved out of the basin where it was needed, first for mining, later for 
irrigation, and finally to support municipal development in cities like Los 
Angeles, Denver, Albuquerque, and San Francisco. Riparian landowners 
objected that no such change could be achieved as against their traditional 
riparian rights to the water and that such rights were implicit in their land 
titles. Of course, as we now know, those claims too were overwhelmingly 
swept aside by the same reasoning that had led to the modification of the 
natural flow doctrine and to the redefinition of navigability. The courts found 
that water was a community resource and that rights in water were always 
contingent on the fundamental needs of the community at the time, reflecting 
natural conditions, such as aridity, or the evolution of social goals. 
In a famous opinion in 1882, the Colorado Supreme Court said "we 
conclude that the common law doctrine is inapplicable here. Imperative 
necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it birth, compels the 
recognition of another doctrine in conflict with the 0Id.,,2 The evolutionary 
character of water law has continued in a variety of contexts. The principle 
of the Coffin3 case that I just quoted, and the commitment to beneficial use 
which, at that time, meant economically productive use as the source and limit 
of water rights, gave rise to another Colorado case some twerity-fIve years 
later in which it was determined that leaving water instream could not qualify 
as a beneficial use and no one could acquire a right to leave water instream.4 
Why? Because by the standards and the goals of that day, water was 
2 Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882). 
3 ld. 
4 Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913). 
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considered too precious to be left in the river. Indeed, it was standard law that 
the only way to perfect the beneficial right of use was physically to take the 
water out of the river and to apply it to some economic purpose. When more 
contemporary values to protect fish and riparian services, as well as 
recreation, came to the fore, it was argued, as it had been when the 
appropriation doctrine first displaced the riparian doctrine, that to treat 
instream flows as beneficial and to allow an individual or a state agency to 
appropriate water instream for environmental protection was to take away the 
established property rights of others to appropriate the water. But the courts 
rejected this claim just as they had rejected the previous traditional claims, 
and today instream uses are everywhere considered beneficial, even essential, 
uses of water. 
So once more, history's wheel turned. I noted a minute ago that Colorado 
eliminated riparian rights from the very beginning of settlement. Many other 
western states, the Dakotas, Oregon, and California, retained some of these 
riparian rights at least for a while. Then in various ways, with the one 
exception of Oklahoma, they either eliminated or restricted the acquisition of 
future riparian rights, although loss by nonuse was absolutely antithetical to 
traditional riparian doctrine. In each such instance, it was asserted that the 
abolition of unused riparian rights was a violation of vested property rights. 
Those claims too have failed. While California courts struggled with this 
issue over many years, they have finally accepted that unused riparian rights 
can be subordinated in order to foster more efficient and more beneficial uses 
of water, as called for by the Constitution's mandate that water be used for 
reasonable and beneficial purposes in the public interest. 5 
Nearly a half century earlier, the California Supreme Court had rejected the 
claims of riparians that they could use water as extravagantly as they wished 
to benefit their lands, however great the adverse impact on others who had a 
need for the water. This pre-existing riparian property right, inherited from 
the times of abundance of water, was abolished by state constitutional 
mandate in 1929, long after the common law entitlement had been recognized. 
Yet again, the courts rejected the claim that riparians' constitutionally 
protected property rights had been violated.6 The courts held that traditional, 
riparian prerogatives were no longer permissible in light of the common 
interest in putting water to beneficial and reasonable use as understood by the 
needs of the time. 
I could extend this list almost endlessly. To your relief, I will not, but I 
hope the central point I'm trying to make is by now obvious. The rules 
governing the use of water have always been in a dynamic relationship with 
S In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979). 
6 Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1933). 
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the evolving values of the community. You will no doubt have noticed that 
in all the examples I have given you so far, I have made little mention of the 
public trust doctrine, as such, and indeed the examples I've provided did not 
rest explicitly on the public trust. The public trust doctrine provides the 
theoretical underpinning of a general legal superstructure that submits water 
rights and water uses to evolving community needs. 
It is, however, in public trust cases that the courts have most fully 
articulated the legal relationship between private use and public entitlement. 
Public trust doctrine in America is nothing new. It is generally traced back to 
a New Jersey case? in 1821 and to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the 
famous Illinois CentralS case in 1892. In each such case, the central message 
was that the land underlying navigable waters could never be privatized to the 
detriment of fundamental public rights in the lands and in the water overlying 
them. The trust is old, but its applications to water diversions and to 
environmental protection is new. . 
In congruence with the fundamental principle that I have been describing, 
public trust doctrine also adapts to emerging social goals and needs. It is often 
mistakenly asserted that the public trust deals only with submerged lands, such 
as tide lands, and thus that it has nothing to do with water used by irrigators 
or municipalities who divert water from rivers or who pump ground water. On 
the contrary, the public trust is centrally about water. States took ownership 
of bottom lands in the original thirteen colonies and later in the public land 
states (of which Hawai'i, of course, is not one) precisely in order to protect 
public uses in the overlying waters, uses that traditionally embraced 
navigation, water-related commerce, fishing, and in some places, fowling. 
Restrictions on disposition of public trust bottom lands were imposed 
primarily to prevent filling or other uses that would limit use of the overlying 
waters or access to them. But there should be no misapprehension about the 
fact that public trust doctrine is primarily a water doctrine and only 
instrumentally a land doctrine. In a time before modem regulatory 
gov!!rnment existed, it was believed that bottom land proprietorship was 
essential to control overlying water use. While it's true that the 1983 Mono 
Lake decision9 in California is the first case that expressly applied the public 
trust to diversionary uses, followed shortly thereafter by Idaho1o (whose 
legislature has set itself up in opposition to the courts), and perhaps next by 
) 
7 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
8 lllinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. lllinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
9 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) 
(commonly referred to as the "Mono Lake" case) [hereinafter, "Mono Lake"]. 
\0 Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 
1983). But see IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201 to -1203 (Matthew Bender 2000). 
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Nevada, II you will find nothing in the public trust cases or in the literature to 
suggest that the trust as protection of overlying waters excludes protection 
against diversionary uses. Indeed it could hardly be argued that diversions 
that impaired public navigation, for example, could not or would not be 
enjoined under the public trust even in its most traditional forms. The 
explanation for the delayed application to appropriations for municipal use or 
irrigation, as we saw in the Mono Lake case l2 or as you've seen in your recent 
Hawai'i case, is founded in the fact that the need did not arise until social 
values evolved to recognize the need to protect instream, environmental, and 
related values. 
Public trust doctrine, like water law doctrine generally, has tracked 
community goals and priorities. During the century and a half dating from the 
time of Arnold v. Mundy,13 the 1821 New Jersey case, up to the era of the 
Mono Lake decision,14 our priorities were overwhelmingly focused on the 
utilization of water to promote settlement and economic development. That 
is what I was describing earlier, noting the adoption of a new navigation 
doctrine, the changes in riparianism, and the innovation of appropriation 
doctrine. During those times, the public interest was viewed as being 
promoted by encouraging diversionary uses, even to the point of disallowing 
or forbidding instream uses. Of course, even in those days, no one thought it 
was a good idea to diminish fisheries or to destroy the biological productivity 
of estuarial areas. It was simply assumed that in the vastness of the country, 
those values would be taken care of in undeveloped streams, that they would 
be protected in reservations such as national parks or wildlife refuges, or that 
they would be dealt with by technological fixes, such as fish hatcheries that 
were to compensate for the destruction of salmon habitat. 
As to the economies of indigenous people, insofar as they depended on 
water, it must be said tragically that for a long time it was generally believed 
that the public interest would be advanced by terminating traditional uses, 
repudiating native culture and beliefs, and assimilating native people into the 
mainstream economy. Today, everywhere in the mainland West, Native 
American water rights in the form of federal reserved rights are being asserted 
and are being recognized though they had been long ignored. As with trust 
rights generally, they do not expire simply because they have been' 
unacknowledged for no matter how long a period of time. Today, each of 
these earlier conceptions that I've described, whether as to indigenous people, 
as to ecological services, or as to threatened species or fisheries, has either 
II Mineral County v. Nevada, 20 P.3d 800 (Nev. 2001) (concurring opinion). 
12 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709. 
13 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
14 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709. 
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been repudiated or sharply revised, just as the various earlier conceptions of 
water rights were revised to meet the public priorities of their day. 
As water doctrine has evolved, so has the common law public trust doctrine, 
often in phase with new statutes and new constitutional provisions that made 
the trust explicit where it had previously been expressed only in common law 
judicial decisions. In terms of the public trust, probably the most significant 
modem decision is not the National AudubonI5 Mono Lake case, which is so 
well-known, but an earlier case called Marks v. Whitney,I6 decided in 1971. 
That case held the scope of public trust protection could evolve with changing 
public values and that the general purpose of the trust to protect public rights 
in overlying water was sufficient to encompass environmental values instream. 
As the court put it, 
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to 
encompass changing public needs .... There is a growing public recognition that 
one of the most important public uses ... is the preservation of those lands in 
their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, 
as open space, and as environments that provide food and habitat for birds and 
marine life .... 17 
One cannot contemplate the Marks case without recognizing that its 
conceptualization of the modem public trust made National Audubon 
inevitable. After all, how can one protect the marine environment without 
water? The adaptive or evolutionary nature of the public trust has been 
recognized in a number of states such as Washington and New Jersey.IS A 
few years after Marks v. Whitney,I9 the North Dakota Supreme Court opined 
that planning must take into account the impact of water use as a public trust 
obligation.2o In New Jersey, the courts have focused attention on beach 
access, recognizing the vastly increased importance of recreational use of 
water in modem times.21 
A similar issue arose recently in Connecticut where limitation of beach 
access to town residents was challenged as a violation of the public trust, and 
while the court did not accept that theory, it did hold that the exclusion 
15 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709. 
16 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971). 
17 [d. at 380. 
18 Orion Corp. v. Washington, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987); State Dep't of Envtl. 
Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d. 
337 (N.J. 1976). 
19 491 P.2d 374. 
20 United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). 
21 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972). 
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violated expressive and associational rights under the Constitution.22 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently found that privatization of waters through 
what is called "dockominium" marinas violated the public trust;23 another 
adaptive use of public trust doctrine to modern recreational conditions and a 
recognition of public as opposed to merely private uses of water. In Vermont, 
the court found that when private uses of trust lands consistent with the trust 
cease, such as use for wharfage, the trust restrictions reemerge and the 
property cannot be treated as free of the public trust. 24 
The public trust is of special importance, as the states have expressly 
recognized, because it invokes not just authority but a duty on the part of 
government to protect public rights. Agencies of the state have an afflrmative 
obligation to come forward and to take on the burden of asserting and 
implementing the public trust. Moreover, the public trust is a continuing 
obligation. In trust waters there can be no such thing as a permanent, 
once-and-for-all allocation of trust waters or land. That principle is essential 
to acknowledge government responsibilities to respond to changing public 
needs and changing roles for water in the economy. National Audubon 
afflrmed that the public trust is a continuing obligation that cannot be 
completed as to any given moment in time, but must remain open to 
accommodate new and changing conditions. That, by the way, was not an 
invention of National Audubon in 1983, but it had been the law in California 
since the 1920s when it was articulated in an off-shore oil development case.25 
Similarly, in the old California Fish26 case going back to 1913, the court 
held that grants of trust property must be read as implicitly reserving public 
rights and public trust uses as against assertions of permanent privatization. 
Other states, such as Arizona, have elevated the public trust to a sovereign 
obligation. The Arizona Supreme Court stated, ''The public trust doctrine is 
a constitutional limit on legislative power. ,,27 The lllinois Supreme Court and 
the lllinois Federal District Court have each overturned express legislative 
grants of trust property to private entities making clear that they view the trust 
as a constitutional mandate.28 The Washington Supreme Court said: "Courts 
review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree of 
judicial scrutiny as if they were measuring that legislation against 
22 Leyden v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001). 
23 ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Res., 635 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. App. 
2001), review granted, _ N.W.2d _ (Wis. 2001). 
24 Vennont v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989). 
25 Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797 (Cal. 1928). 
26 People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913). 
27 San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999). 
28 People ex rei. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (lll. 1976); Lake Mich. Fed'n 
v. U.S. Anny Corps of Eng'rs, 742 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. lll. 1990). 
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constitutional protection.,,29 Each of these approaches in its own way is in 
accord with the general constitutional view in western states that water 
belongs to the people, that it can never be fully privatized, and that the public 
interest in water can never be granted away. 
As the New Jersey court put it 180 years ago, such a result "could never be 
long borne by a free people."30 Speaking more broadly, it could be said that 
the whole history of property is not one of fixity but of adaptive change within 
an evolving social setting, and this process goes back as far as one might want 
to look. At one time, only eldest sons could inherit. When that posture 
became socially unacceptable, a dramatic change in property rights occurred. 
Similarly, and until much more recently, when a woman married, all of her 
property became her husband's to dispose of at his sole will. As the status of 
women changed, legislatures enacted Married Women's Property Acts, and 
ended the husband's dominion over spousal property. Well within the last 
century, child labor laws, maximum wage and hour laws, and minimum safety 
standards for workers have each invalidated valuable, contractual property 
rights that had previously been recognized. 
Sometimes new technological information, such as knowledge about 
radiation, required that formerly valuable equipment be taken off the market. 
At one time, as some of you may recall, every shoe store had a machine with 
an x-ray that x-rayed your feet to show that the shoes were not too tight. 
Modem health laws made those machines valueless. Property became non-
property. The invention of the airplane forced us to modify the notion that one 
owned his land from the center of the earth to the top of the sky. Sometimes, 
conversely, technology increases property rights. Newly intrusive eaves-
dropping equipment, for example, moves us to reconsider the definition of 
what it means to trespass. 
Sometimes social norms change. In the late nineteenth century, when a 
number of states adopted prohibition on liquor sales, stores and distilleries 
were left with liquor they could not legally sell. Courts rejected the claim that 
such laws violated property rights in the remaining stocks.31 When the 
railroad was invented, noise and smoke, which by earlier standards would be 
a nuisance, became a feature of contemporary life that people were required 
to tolerate to some extent. In light of this history, it can hardly come as a 
surprise to anyone today that we should see property doctrine evolving to 
bring about a reorientation of traditional relationships between water devoted 
to diversionary offstream uses and instream retention. It should come as no 
surprise that there are now increased restrictions to promote water quality, and 
29 Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998). 
30 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,78 (1821). 
31 Muglerv. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
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that the long ignored claims of indigenous people are finally getting 
recognition. 
Although the public trust doctrine has been one important means through 
which some of these reallocations have been achieved, it is not the only one 
and many parallel changes could take place, and indeed are taking place 
through other means. Even the most casual observer of contemporary 
resource law is aware that statutes like the Clean Water Act and ,the 
Endangered Species Act have been instrumental in reallocation of diversions 
in order to create greater in stream flows. Indeed, within recent decades, we 
have seen instream flow rights recognized for the first time in a number of 
states and have seen a much greater use by water pennit agencies, as well as 
federal land management agencies, to maintain and enlarge bypass flows so 
as to protect instream resources downstream. The U.S. Forest Service has 
utilized bypass flows as a condition on its right-of-way renewals for water 
projects and the same sort of conditions are being required on hydropower 
licenses as they come up for renewal. We have even seen these issues arise 
in the reopening of interstate water allocations in the U.S. Supreme Court.32 
In addition, active litigation and settlements by Indians to finalize reserved 
right claims for reservations have made mainland native people and their 
traditional claims major factors in ongoing water reallocations that are taking 
place almost everywhere in the western states. Obviously, many of these 
developments parallel changes that may be generated by Hawai 'i' s recent 
Waiahole Ditch case. To be sure, there are some features of that opinion that 
I'm sure will be discussed today that are distinctive to Hawai'i, or at least are 
only incipient in other states, such as the application of the trust to domestic 
use, to ground water without explicit reference to navigable waters, and 
references to native and traditional and customary uses. 
Of course, ,California decisions also generated new applications of old 
principles, as I'm sure Jan Stevens will discuss in considerably more detail. 
In addition, the Hawai'i opinion may suggest a level of engaged judicial 
oversight that has not, or at least has not yet, been a feature of water rights 
administration in some other states under the public trust doctrine, regarding 
issues like burden of proof and the so-called precautionary principle. 
However, there are many examples, some of which I've already noted, of 
vigorous judicial commitment to protect public trust values, even including 
invalidation of legislation that was detennined to undennine the public trust. 
Active implementation of public rights in water reflecting contemporary 
public values, rather than those of an earlier time, would put Hawai 'i squarely 
in the mainstream of America's evolving water law system. Thanks. 
32 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1 (1995). 
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JIM PAUL: Thank you very much, Prof. Sax. Now I'd like to introduce Peter 
Adler. He is our moderator for the first panel. 
PETER ADLER: Good morning everybody. Thank you, Jim. Thank you 
Prof. Sax for a very thoughtful start to our symposium today. 
Here's the way we are going to do this panel. First, I'm going to ask each 
of our distinguished panel members, all of whom are attorneys and two of 
whom are current or former chairs of the Board of Land and Natural 
Resources, to take five minutes each to summarize what's in the papers that 
people have in front of them but haven't yet had a chance to read. I know 
there will be a little bit of bargaining and dickering over time so some of them 
may yield time to others. Watching attorneys negotiate can be exasperating 
so I suggest we don't watch them too closely and just count on them to divide 
the time up and not go on too long. Jim Paul, I'm going to ask you to start, if 
you would, and tell us what's in your paper with as much particularity on 
Hawai'i's application of public trust as you can. 
JIM PAUL: Thank you, Peter. Let me see if I can take less than five minutes. 
I have a paper that's in the materials that is an attempt to summarize the 
Waiiihole Ditch case with particular focus on the public trust doctrine, and 
I've tried to do that by quoting excerpts, hopefully in an organized way, that 
helps the reader understand what is a lengthy and at times complex decision 
and to make it perhaps a little bit easier to understand. I've also tried to pull 
out lists of what I believe are the duties of the state as a trustee of the 
statewide water resources trust, referred to for the first time by the Waiiihole 
decision. I tried to list those duties as I believe they flow from the decision. 
I tried to suggest duties of water applicants and the burdens they must carry 
as a result of the decision. I talked a little bit about the burden of proof issues 
as set forth by the Supreme Court, which may be, or certainly is a candidate 
for, the most important aspect of the decision for some people. And finally, 
I tried to talk a little bit about what the Hawai'i Supreme Court decision said 
about the relationship between counties in particular, county planning 
processes, and the water commission. 
Let me suggest that there are some fundamental principles about the public 
trust doctrine as a result of the Waiiihole Ditch case, seven or eight 
fundamental principals of the Hawai 'i public trust doctrine. Briefly and with 
some simplification for purposes of being brief. First, at its core, it provides 
enduring protection of certain precious natural resources in Hawai'i for the 
benefit of not only all people but for the benefit of future generations. 
Second, the State of Hawai'i is the trustee, the trustee of the public trust 
resources with all of the duties that go with the notion of being a trustee. 
Third, the public trust doctrine is a powerful property right of its own that in 
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most circumstances takes precedence over other property rights whether they 
are private property rights or governmental property rights. Fourth, the public 
trust doctrine requires principled public and rational planning processes 
concerning the use and potential destruction of public trust resources. Fifth, 
the burden is squarely placed on those who seek to use the public trust 
resources such as the WaHihole Ditch water, squarely placed on those who 
seek permits to use that water, to prove that there will be no significant harm 
to the public resource. The court noted that that burden is higher in the case 
of private commercial uses. Sixth, Prof. Sax stated the so-called precautionary 
principle, when scientific data and analysis is simply inadequate to assess the 
potential damage to resources from requested uses. That lack of science 
should not be used as a basis to permit the use, the degradation, or the 
destruction of the public trust resource. The science-based precautionary 
principle should apply to protect resources when the harm from use or 
consumptive activity cannot be measured with some degree of confidence. 
Seventh, the public trust doctrine closely mirrors native Hawaiian and native 
American notions of stewardship of natural resources and the relationship 
between human beings and those resources. And eighth, as Prof. Sax has just 
articulated, hopefully convincingly, the doctrine evolves and it is a central 
feature of the doctrine that it has evolved and it will continue to evolve. 
PETER ADLER: Thank you. Ken, can I ask you to go next so we try to take 
this somewhat in order. 
KEN KUPCHAK: Thank you, Peter. Despite the fact that I've written a law 
review article in 1971 suggesting the burden of proof as it is today in this 
decision, today I'm acting as the devil' s advocate, the ghost of Christmas 
future, exclaiming that the emperor has no clothes. Federal law suggests that 
Hawai 'i' s public trust doctrine evolved or was born anew in August 1959, the 
moment of statehood. What were the public resources in 1959? These 1959 
resources are determined by law and not by science. They are determined by 
legal decisions and possibly how the government itself addressed these rights 
and maybe even taxed them. In 1959, public trust resources cannot be 
expanded without paying just compensation. The 1978 constitutional 
amendments that we made cannot take away previously recognized property 
rights. The highest courts in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
New York have acknowledged, as Prof. Callies has indicated, that, if the state 
courts drift from the historic trust moorings, they risk running afoul of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
In the last nine years, the U.S. Supreme Court has thrice reinforced this 
caution previously recognized by Justice Stewart in 1977, when he said, "A 
sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents, ... 
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[would not] defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property 
without due process oflaw ... :>33 In 1992, the Lucas Court,34 which created 
the "background principle" exception, noted that only "objectively reasonable 
application of relevant precedent" would qualify. 
This past year in Bush v. Gore,35 Rehnquist, with Scalia and Thomas 
concurring, noted that state attempts to redefine background principles can't 
undermine a takings claim. This echoed a previous dissent to a denial of 
certiorari by Scalia, joined by O'Connor, in 1994. In 1997, the New York 
Court of Appeals was able to read these tea leaves in refusing to expand the 
public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters, because of the sudden and 
unstable impacts of such a decision on private property rights.36 
Let me suggest that the reversal of City Mill37 on science may run afoul of 
this caution by the Supreme Court. If so, where else does Waiahole lead us? 
Like PASH,38 Waiahole is a lawyer's dream. There are no standards. This 
case may create an unconstitutionally broad delegation of authority to the 
Water Commission. This decision provides few clues as to what a public trust 
use, purpose, or value is today. Even more scary is that these unknown terms 
are said to possess the potential to continually evolve. The only place they 
seem to come to rest, even momentarily, is at the Supreme Court. 
These concepts should immediately intimidate any landowner, developer, 
or lender. Assuming that you could freeze "uses," "purposes," and "values," 
we are also missing the next starting point that is, what is the "natural state" 
of the stream in question? To what point do we measure the natural state? 
Pre-Menehune, pre-Tahitian and pre-Marques an immigration, pre-Cook, pre-
Mahele, pre-overthrow, pre-annexation, pre-Ditch, Pre-Statehood, pre-1978, 
or pre-code? What "stream flow" guarantees the perpetuation of a "natural 
state?" Is it a minimum? Is it a seasonally fluctuating standard? Is a use 
moratorium required while this is determined? What standards ensure that 
such a determination is not arbitrary? 
Assuming that we can clear these hurdles, what water use allocation 
guidelines are there? Do instream uses trump diversions? How about the 
33 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
34 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
3S 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
36 David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Background Principles: Custom, Public Trust. and 
Preeexisting Statutes as Exceptions to Regulatory Takings, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS 
ISSUES: THE PUBUC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES § 6.10, at 139-40 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 
2002). 
37 City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm'n, 30 Haw. 912 (1929). 
38 Public Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai 'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 245, 
903 P.2d 1246 (1995) [hereinafter "PASff']. 
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following diversions: drinking water, customary and traditional uses, 
agriculture or aquaculture? 
And what justifies a distinction between agriculture/aquaculture and other 
private uses? As between offstream uses, are there any allocation guidelines? 
The court's vested right dicta arguably is limited in application to distinguish 
between public trust uses and non-public trust uses. The public trust doctrine 
provides little support for favoring one private user over another. A use would 
either seem to be a public trust use or not. And we have not yet touched on 
the tension between this new constitutional child and pre-existing 
constitutional rights, including those superior rights under the federal 
constitution. Of course, under the police power, the state could always take 
what it needed, but it had to pay for it. 
By trying to ex post facto shoehorn in under a Lucas footnote the recently 
resurrected public trust doctrine, Hawai'i seeks to avoid paying the piper. 
Will it be successful? We won't know until either the Water Commission or 
the Court actually denies the previously private use. The Waiiihole majority 
uses the words "exclusive use" when it distinguishes private uses from "public 
trust" uses. This might be a clue that the court did not mean to totally 
disenfranchise private uses, but rather merely subjected them to rationing. 
One potential avenue through this maze might be to recognize pre-existing 
offstream uses, but limit them to their share of an intermittent and fluctuating 
"surplus" over the predetermined minimum "instream natural state" flow. 
This "surplus" might be divided pro rata between the preexisting offstream 
uses with reasonable and equally applied conservation standards. 
New uses, however, might have to run the gauntlet of pre-qualification 
regulation and justification. Perhaps new uses might be allowed only to the 
extent that either sufficient surplus remained or rights to a pre-existing use 
were acquired. This might create a market in offstream use entitlements, but 
only in favor of pre-qualified new uses. 
To the extent that, after some mystical guideline-less balancing, offstream 
public trust uses trump instream or pre-existing offstream private uses and 
survive the "takings" scrutiny, these trumped uses might also vie for any 
resultant surplus. 
Without legislative-adopted, equally applied guidelines, however, the 
present system is subject to attacks for being arbitrary and a breeding ground 
for favoritism and graft. The bottom line, however, is that it appears that my 
workload is guaranteed for the future. 
PETER ADLER: Thank you, Ken. Tim, if you would go next. 
TIM JOHNS: Thank you, Ken, and what do you really think? I am a member 
of the land board, but nothing that I say today should indicate my preference 
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to vote one way or another on particular issues that might come in front of me 
so I'm speaking today as a private citizen. You could look at the paper that 
I submitted. The question that was posed to me was what is the public trust 
doctrine in Hawai'i? The short answer is it's really whatever the Supreme 
Court says it is. And I'm not trying to be flip about that, but basically it is a 
common law doctrine, it has its grounding in the Constitution but it's an 
underpinning that's floating around in a lot of case law and it's only going to 
be brought into focus by the Supreme Court, and possibly by the Water 
Commission, but, I think ultimately by the Supreme Court. 
What I tried to do in my paper even more briefly than what Jim did, is talk 
a little about the lessons of Waiiihole and then raise some questions that I 
thought might be instructive to think about in terms of the Waiiihole water 
decision and what kind of themes might be floating around Waiiihole and the 
public trust doctrine. One major theme that I saw was that the public trust 
doctrine is an intragenerational, as well as an intergenerational, equity 
doctrine. So, it's a way to protect certain public uses in certain public 
resources, to have those uses distributed equitably among people today. It is 
also an intergenerational equity doctrine, so future generations' uses of certain 
public resources are to be protected, and that's very much in line with native 
Hawaiian land management practices and theories. I described it in a bit more 
detail in my paper, but basically it's intragenerational and intergenerational, 
so it's not only people today but also people in the future who are being 
protected. 
The second major theme that I saw was that the public trust doctrine, as 
espoused in the Waiiihole water case, is both substantively protective, as well 
as procedurally protective. It sets out certain substantive rights, but it also, as 
Jim alluded to when he said the burden of proof is possibly one of the most 
important parts of the decision, has a very large procedural component to it as 
well. So for those of us that are going to be wrestling with those decisions in 
the future, the procedural part of it is going to be very important, and Jim 
spent quite a bit of time in his paper going through how those procedural 
protections are set up. Waiiihole not only sets out substantive rules but also 
procedural protection as well. In other words, it sets out what is protected, but 
also how it should be protected on a daily basis. 
The second part of my paper addressed questions in light of the lessons of 
Waiiihole. Now the public trust doctrine may evolve in Hawai 'i in the future, 
but if you want to know what the public trust doctrine means now, if you read 
Waiiihole very narrowly and very closely, it's pretty clear what it means for 
the Water Commission, the Waiiihole participants, and Oahu water planning. 
It's less clear what it might mean for the Water Commission issues that come 
down the road that don't fit the same fact pattern as the Waiiihole case. So, 
for example, what if it's a public use versus a public use? What does 
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Waitihole tell us about that instead of a public versus a private use? To recap, 
the first level of question is, what does Waitihole mean for water planning in 
general? And that's pretty clear. I think the Supreme Court was very clear 
about that. It's less clear when you start talking about what Waitihole means 
for the Water Commission's business in general. I think it's even less clear 
when you start talking about the Land Board, the Land Use Commission, and 
Chris Yuen's planning department. How do you apply the Waitihole decision 
to their actions with regard to water decisions? And then the next question 
that I posed is, what about non-water resources, public trust resources, or other 
resources that are protected under the Constitution or held in trust by the state 
for our people today and in future generations? Does the public trust doctrine, 
as set out in Waitihole, only cover water, or does it cover land, or does it cover 
any other public trust resource? 
So those are the four kinds of questions that, depending on how the supreme 
court and/or the bodies that are going to be forced to implement and decide 
those questions, will determine what the public trust doctrine is going to look 
like in Hawai'i in a few years. And even though Prof. Sax said we are in the 
mainstream, I think that we're probably going to be a bit on the cutting edge 
as well, depending on how those questions are answered. 
PETER ADLER: Bill, if you would give us a summary of what's in your 
paper. 
BILL TAM: I would like to disagree with the last two speakers, although 
they're old friends. I have more faith actually in the decision and in the water 
code than I have heard so far. I would begin by reminding all of us that the 
supreme court in the McBryde39 decision pointed back to the source of title to 
land in Hawai'i so I am less afraid of the takings argument for a very simple 
reason. The background principles of property law in Hawai'i that Justice 
Scalia referred to in the Lucas case, and which the McBryde court referred to, 
go back to the very principles of the 1848 Land Commission and recognize 
that the public trust doctrine in Hawai'i is a function of Hawai'i law. It is not 
a national rule. It is Hawai'i law. The background principles include the 
following statement that is embedded in the title of all land in Hawai 'i. "What 
is the nature of the extent of that power which the King has bestowed on this 
board?" I.e., the 1848 Land Commission board. 
[H]is private feudatory right as an individual participant in the ownership, not his 
sovereign prerogatives as head of the nation. Among these prerogatives which 
affect lands are the following: ... [t]o encourage and to enforce the usufruct of 
the lands for the common good. These prerogatives, power and duties his 
39 McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174,504 P.2d 1330 (1973). 
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majesty ought not, and ergo, he cannot surrender. Hence the following 
confirmations of the board and titles consequent upon them must be understood 
subject to these conditions.40 
Hawai'i's public trust doctrine has been embedded, not simply in the title of 
all the land. It has always been subject to that. So Ken's notion that it 
depends on the 1959 determination of the rights here is in error. But under the 
police power of any sovereign, there is always that ability to regulate. 
Hawai'i adopted the public trust doctrine, not in the Waiiihole decision, not 
in the McBryde decision, not in the 1978 ConCon, not in statehood, not in 
territorial time, not even in 1899 when the Republic Supreme Court formally 
adopted the common law doctrine, King v. Oahu Railway.41 Arguably, the 
public trust doctrine, which was part of common law in England and in the 
United States, was adopted in 1892 when Hawai'i Revised Statutes 1-1 said 
that the common law of England, as amended by the common law of the 
United States and the statutory law, is the law of Hawai "i. 
There is another notion of public trust which I want people to understand. 
It is a doctrine, distinct, but related. There are express public trusts as in the 
Admissions Act. This is a different line of cases and a different set of 
principles, although they overlap. The doctrine we are talking about here 
arises in judicial context as a limitation on the power of government itself to 
alienate permanently those trust assets. 
In figuring out what the rules are for allocation going forward, I am more 
confident than Tim or Ken about how to figure out the answers. I would offer 
you the following thought. Think of the decisions that anyone in the 
government must make when they go to work in the morning. There are a lot 
of people here who are going to be faced with this issue in the next couple of 
years. You get to your desk in the morning and how do you actually do this? 
I would offer the following suggestion: Think of an inverted pyramid in which 
the fundamental questions have to be answered before you can get to the 
secondary questions, and the fundamental questions are, at a minimum, what 
is necessary to protect the resource now and in the future? Now, the supreme 
court on page 146 of their decision said that, looking at the preface and the 
purposes of the water code, there is not a categorical priority for protectional 
overuses. That is true in any particular instance where you have a specific 
decision you have to make, but with regard to the overall protection of the 
resource, it is necessarily a categorical imperative. It is necessary that the 
resource be in existence before you allocate it. So the issues that you have to 
sort through must start like a metaphorical raindrop in the hydrologic cycle 
from the top and work its way down. There are a series of rules with regard 
40 [d. at 186,504 P.2d at 1338. 
41 King v. Oahu Ry. & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717 (1899). 
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to how you allocate under the common law. There are riparian doctrine rules 
and there are the correlative use ground water rules as modified by the recent 
decision. We're not operating in a vacuum. Properly understood, those are 
sorted out. They do not say how much you get under a particular instance 
because that would depend on all the other competing uses. In Hawai'i, as 
Jim pointed out, there is a very close parallel between public trust doctrine and 
traditional Hawaiian customs. The public trust doctrine is just the secular 
western way of describing a lot of what Hawaiian practices were. So Hawai'i 
is particularly suited for the public trust doctrine in its own traditions and 
customs. People should look at those as parallel ideas employing different 
vocabularies to do similar things. They're not at odds with each other. 
I think another factor that tends to get forgotten in academic discussions 
about the law are geographic facts affecting Hawai 'i. That is what we all have 
to keep in mind. Although often unstated, we are on islands. We are bound 
by the shoreline and the ocean. We are here at the grace of the mountains that 
catch enough of the rainfall as clouds graze by and fill up parched aquifers. 
The water in Hawai 'i' s streams, unlike the Columbia River, for example, runs 
quickly down to the ocean. Hawai'i streams run out in a day. We, more than 
other places on continental landmasses, are constrained by the geographical 
limits and our close interrelationships. While prior appropriation might work 
on the mainland, it is inappropriate in Hawai'i, both by custom and by 
geography. So the public trust doctrine is uniquely suited for describing a lot 
of the traditions that already exist. The notion of caring for the future and 
caring for future generations is embedded in the culture here. Prof. Sax has 
written about Kenneth Boulding's notion that we are now on "spaceship 
earth." Our Hawaiian cousins figured that out a long time ago. They came 
here on small canoes.· Finally, I want to bring to your attention two 
chronologies at the end of my paper: 1) the evolving nature of Hawai'i water 
law as Prof. Sax inentioned, and 2) a conceptual evolution. Thank you. 
PETER ADLER: Gil, I want to invite you as a commentator if you have any 
reflections on either the points made or the issues that have been raised 
because they're starting to come up. 
GIL COLOMA-AGARAN: I just wanted to make a couple of observations 
about some of the things that you've said and also about the public trust 
doctrine itself. First, I want you to think about the fact that Peter said that this 
entire panel here is made up of all lawyers except for himself. The first 
question you really have to think about is, do you want the only people who 
work on these types of issues to be lawyers? [Laughter.] This is the Waiahole 
decision. I've been carrying it around for a couple of weeks now. When I 
first read the decision, I read it and said this may be something just for 
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lawyers, but I actually read it because I was sort of interested in seeing what 
they said. Now that I'm back at the department, I had to read it to see what 
they are telling us to do, and it's a lot easier to say it than to do it. 
And the next thing I want to talk a little about is the notion of who the 
trustee is. I think a lot of people who will read the decision will say it's the 
Water Commission, but it's also the state legislature, and that's something 
people should take seriously because when I say it's a lot easier to say than to 
do, a lot of it's going to depend on what kind of resources the Water 
Commission and other people are interested in doing or getting the best 
scientific information you can have in order to allow decision makers to move 
forward. You're going to need resources. In a couple of weeks, hopefully, 
we'll have something coming before the Water Commission from some panel 
that the Waiahole decision required that will be setting up a format to look at 
funding some studies. We also have some legislative proposals to help fund 
those studies as well. But what usually happens is the usual rule that the 
executive proposes, the legislature disposes, and sometimes you don't get 
what you're looking for. 
The other thing I wanted to make a comment on a little bit, and I don't 
necessarily disagree with what Bill is saying, but I think we have to be very 
careful in the notion of whether or not the V.S. Constitution doesn't ultimately 
control what happens in Hawai'i if we're part of this country. I know that 
you're saying that the origin of the trust is really set in Hawaiian law and I 
don't know if you can say that separate or apart from what V.S. law is. I 
appreciate very much what Jim Paul said in his summary of the case, but I 
would encourage everybody to try to read the whole thing. One thing about 
summaries is that it sometimes depends on what you're looking for in the 
decision. I've seen summaries that focus on something on page sixty-five, for 
example, where the court said: "Apart from the question of historic practice, 
reason and necessity dictate that the public trust may have to accommodate 
offstream diversions inconsistent with the mandate of protection to the 
unavoidable impairment of public instream uses and values." If that's all you 
have in summary of what the Waiahole case says then that suggests that, yeah, 
you can do the diversions, you can do a lot of things, but there's nothing 
protective about it. The other last thing is really again going back to who do 
you want making the decisions and the people that are appointed to these 
positions? What do they have to know before becoming part of that panel? 
[Q & A Section omitted] 
PETER ADLER: I would like to introduce Bill Tam, who is going to introduce 
our next speaker, Mr. Jan Stevens. Bill was the lawyer to the Water 
Commission for over ten years, and as many of you know was the lawyer for 
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the Water Commission during most of the underlying proceedings in the 
Waiiihole case. 
BILL TAM: This morning we're honored to have a second speaker with 
enormous experience in the area of the public trust doctrine. Jan Stevens has 
been in the trenches for the last thirty-five to forty years trying to make the 
public trust doctrine work in California. Jan is responsible for introducing Mr. 
Don Maughn, the then-current chair of the California Water Resources 
Control Board, to Hawai'i. Don Maughn came here in 1987 and spoke at the 
state legislature and people's water conference. His presentation to legislators 
was critical in making them realize the importance of adopting a water code. 
Jan has been a lifelong public servant. He has brought a persistent 
intelligence and undaunted courage to that job. He has been a role model for 
other people in public life as to how to behave and how to bring the public 
issues to the floor of the right forums. Jan Stevens. 
JAN STEVENS: Thank you very much, Bill. It's really a pleasure to be here 
in more ways than one. I've enjoyed this program enormously. The chant was 
deeply moving and appropriate, and the hospitality has been exceptional. I'll 
do my best to try and assist you in dealing with this complex antediluvian and 
ancient theory, the public trust. 
I was interested to hear the Waiiihole Ditch hearings likened to the O.J. 
Simpson trial, and I wondered what Johnny Cochran might have done with 
this. Perhaps he would come up with an argument for water use like this, "If 
the use don't fit, you must change it." Maybe that would have convinced the 
water board. It's hard to simplify these matters but I do want to share some 
of my feelings about implementation of the trust and how it's worked in four 
cases in California. 
It's hard to define the public trust doctrine. I think this program has gone 
far toward analyzing the beautifully drafted and very thoughtfully prepared 
opinion of the Hawai'i Supreme Court. When I was in one of my first public 
trust hearings in the California Supreme Court, Justice Richardson (no 
relationship to Chief Justice William S. Richardson, but a very brilliant man) 
leaned over, smiled, and said, "What is this thing that you call a public trust, 
that you're trying to impress upon Clear Lake?" Although literally foot after 
foot of pleadings had been filed attempting to define it, obviously the court 
had not grasped our argument. So, I stammered out something as I usually do, 
about how it's an interest of the public in property, akin to an easement, which 
precedes that of individual owners. And, as usual, I thought the next day 
about an example that might have been much better. Based on the gospel of 
St. Paul, I could have said, "It's the substance of things hoped for and the 
evidence of things unseen." And perhaps this is what it is in Waiiihole. 
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Now I want to welcome Hawai'i to the world of western water. Remember 
what Wallace Stegner said about the west: "It's about water." I was somewhat 
surprised that a state that I thought was blessed with large quantities of water 
would still be suffering from the conflicts and the scarcities that have pursued 
most of the arid west, particularly California. But since such conflicts exist 
here, I want to welcome you to the world of the water buffaloes, beasts that 
historically have rampaged over lakes, rivers, and underground basins in the 
west, defending what they perceive to be their rights against a motley but 
menacing crowd of fishermen, bird watchers, biologists, and 
environmentalists. The term "water buffalo," I think, is particularly suitable 
here. It's traditionally applied to the defenders of vested water rights, 
members of a very small and arcane water law bar. It can be contrasted to the 
phrase "tree hugger," which is usually applied by water buffaloes to 
environmentalists and others who advocate instream protections. 
This buffalo must exist in Hawai'i because the dictionary says it is found 
in most tropical and subtropical regions. It's defined as an animal that, when 
pestered, wallows in the water on damp soil for protection. 
For years the water buffaloes had things pretty much their own way. The 
water agencies believed they had no alternative but to approve an 
appropriation if the water was going to be put to an economic use. Riparians 
could draw their water subject to little control, and the owners of underlying 
ground water could pump to their heart's content. But as the great American 
poet Bob Dylan said, ''The times they were a changin'." And as Joseph Sax 
said, "Beneath the murky navigable waters, there stirred an ancient doctrinal 
beast capable of giving the water buffalo a good fight." 
The public trust doctrine goes back to Roman law. The Emperor Justinian 
is the ancient father of the public trust, just as Professor Joe Sax is its modern 
and youthful father. A primary attribute of public trust is that it's a part of 
governmental sovereignty. What we need to remember about the public trust 
is that it's an attribute of sovereignty that cannot be dealt away by legislatures 
or by administrative agencies. It is a central function of government. This 
trusteeship, this duty going back to Roman law, reflects that some things like 
the air, the waters, their beds and banks, cannot be reduced to that kind of 
"sole and despotic dominion and control" that Locke and Blackstone 
recognized as private property. Even in those days, the tidelands and the 
waters over them were held in trust for the people, and as the New Jersey 
Court stated in 1821, reducing them to positive possession was a concept that 
violated the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, and 
which never could be long borne by a free people. This statement came only 
thirty years after the revolution, which makes the court's words especially 
meaningful. 
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In this country, the trust was articulated in the Illinois Centrar2 decision in 
1892 by an otherwise rather conservative justice, but one of decided views and 
a flrm character. Justice Steven Field came from California. He served on the 
California Supreme Court and then the United States Supreme Court. He 
wrote an eloquent opinion in Illinois Central, saying essentially that the 
legislature had no power to dispose of the people's interest in the navigable 
waters surrounding them. This has pervaded the law of ultimately every state 
since then. It is the principle that inspired the vehement declaration in the 
Mono Lake decision, that the trust is an afflrmation of the duty of the state to 
protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and 
tidelands. 
Logic compelled the conclusion that the rule of law protecting the waters 
of the state, as Prof. Sax said, necessarily must extend beyond the beds and 
banks of commercially navigable rivers and lakes. In the nineteenth century, 
commerce was important. We didn't have much time for recreation or bird 
watching, so it's natural that the public trust was deflned in terms of 
commerce, navigation, and flsheries. But the public trust is a common law 
concept, and it has evolved in a number of different ways to protect public 
rights not only in commercially navigable rivers, but also in rivers capable of 
recreational use-rivers that support flsheries and riparian values. 
There is another basis for the common law evolution of the trust, and that 
is the fact that when you do things in the tributaries of large navigable waters, 
they can affect those waters. They can obstruct navigation, and they can 
pollute, and they can destroy public trust values, which historically and 
traditionally exist within the larger water bodies. In the nineteenth century, 
hydraulic mining was a major industry in California, and the rubble washed 
down mountains. Debris obstructed the American and Sacramento Rivers way 
downstream, flooding flelds and wiping out farmers. In a historic decision, 
the California Supreme Court upheld the prohibition of hydraulic mining on 
trust grounds. It didn't occur on the river itself; it occurred way upstream, but 
it was ruining public trust values in the navigable rivers, and the public trust 
was applied as a basis for stopping it. It was inevitable that this would lead 
to National Audubon,43 an opinion which so eloquently explained why the 
public trust should protect the waters of Mono Lake. The facts of the Mono 
Lake case have been widely published. Mono Lake is the largest body of 
water entirely within California. Its large population of brine, shrimps, and 
flies made it a virtual avian travel-lodge, frequented by large numbers of 
California gulls, grebes, Wilson's Phalaropes, snowy plovers, and other birds 
that were annual migrants. 
42 illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
43 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
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By 1941, the Los Angeles Aqueduct, which was originally pushed up to the 
Owens Valley to take the waters of Owens Lake, was extended into the Mono 
Basin and started diverting the water going into the Mono Lake as well. 
Now, by the time the National Audubon case had been filed in 1979 by a 
small motley crew of environmentalists, represented on a pro bono case by 
Morrison and Foerster, the city had largely drained Owens Lake and had 
begun diverting water from the Mono Lake Basin in greatly increased amounts 
through a second "barrel" of its aqueduct. Since 1941, when the diversions 
began, Mono Lake had dropped over forty feet. Its volume was reduced 
nearly fifty percent, and its salinity had nearly doubled to the point where even 
brine flies and shrimp creatures would not long be able to survive. Nearly 
15,000 acres of dry lake bed had been exposed, giving rise to toxic dust 
storms, and creating a land bridge to Negit Island, then the principal nesting 
place for the California gulls. This bridge made it easy for predators to raid 
their nests. 
By then most of the Owens Valley, and the Mono Basin as well, were 
owned by the L.A. Department of Water and Power. There was some forest 
service land left, but very little private land. And when you went through that 
whole pristine area of the Sierra, you would see L.A. Department of Water 
and Power trucks everywhere, carrying forth their duties of making sure that 
the water went down to this great city. 
The city engineers tried a number of things to protect the gulls. They tried 
blasting to increase the channel; that didn't work. They put up big fences, 
coyote-proof fences supposedly, and we went out there and saw the coyotes' 
tracks pacing up and down in front of the fences until they found a place 
where they could jump in, take a short swim, and have a delicious meal. It 
wasn't very hard to realize that the only ultimate solution to saving Mono 
Lake and preventing it from becoming that "saline sump" that the city already 
saw it as, was by increasing the amount of water going into it. This, of 
necessity, would result in decreasing the amount of water going to Los 
Angeles. 
Well, you can imagine what a gargantuan struggle ensued from this. The 
1979 lawsuit was based on the public trust theory, one which had not been 
applied to water diversions in California, except by indirection in the early 
decisions prohibiting practices that affected waters downstream by siltation 
and debris. After a great many maneuvers through state and federal courts, the 
case finally reached the California Supreme Court. That court issued its 
historic National Audubon opinion holding that "appropriative water rights 
and the public trust doctrine were part of an integrated system of water law 
that permitted Audubon to pursue the public trust against the city." 
Now the court realized that the public trust doctrine was on a collision 
course, as it said, with the appropriative rights system. These were rights that 
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the city believed it had secured fair and square. They were rights that, 
hitherto, the administrative agency charged with administering the water rights 
system believed it had no alternative but to grant, regardless of predictions of 
harm to the public trust values and the fisheries of the state. In reaching its 
decision, the court stressed four basic principles, all of them rooted in trust 
law: one, under the public trust doctrine, every citizen has standing to bring 
an action to protect the public trust. So the Mono Lake Committee, this small 
band of heroes in the Mono Basin who were virtually penniless but dedicated, 
had standing to bring this action, as did the National Audubon Society; two, 
the public trust applied to the non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters; 
three, it imposed a duty of continuing supervision and control over the public 
trust values of Mono Lake, a large navigable lake in California; four, it 
required the consideration of trust impacts in evaluating the water rights of the 
city, and it imposed the power and duty to avoid harm to trust values 
whenever feasible-a power not bound by past decisions made with respect 
to those water rights. 
Southern L.A.' s water rights were not frozen in law. Public trust principles 
prevent any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a 
manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust. 
Now there was a caveat, just as there was in the Waiiihole case. The court 
recognized that as a matter of current and historical necessity, the legislature 
may authorize the diversion of water to distant parts of the state, even though 
unavoidable harm to trust uses of the source stream may result. The court 
recognized, in other words, that water had been going to Los Angeles for 
many, many years, and the city was somewhat dependent on it. This requires 
a balancing, but one involving the state's affirmative duty to take the public 
trust into account in planning the allocation of water resources and to protect 
trust uses whenever feasible. In the Mono Lake dispute, the water board had 
essentially thrown up its hands. In 1940, when L.A. perfected its permits, it 
concluded it was powerless to impose conditions to protect trust values. Forty 
years later, the California court took a fresh look and concluded that neither 
the legislature, the water board, or any judicial body had determined that the 
needs of Los Angeles outweighed the needs of the Mono Basin, and that the 
benefit was worth the price. Nor had any responsible body determined 
whether some lesser taking would better balance the diverse interests 
involved. 
Accordingly, the court held that all uses of water, including public trust 
uses, must now conform to both public trust considerations and the state 
constitutional standard of reasonable use. 
Well, this case went two places on remand. First off, it went to the Superior 
Court in EI Dorado County for initial consideration and implementation of the 
California Supreme Court's decision. It was assigned to Judge Terrence 
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Finney, an ex-district attorney whose previous experience was largely 
criminal, and who was initially concerned at being saddled with such a 
monster case, handled by large bands of attorneys who flew in from all over 
the state. 
National Audubon and the Mono Lake Committee asked the court to enjoin 
the city's diversions pending a final water rights determination. The hearings 
went for two and a half months. This was perhaps the eighth or ninth year of 
the Mono Lake litigation, a short case by water rights standards, but one 
which was dear to many. Ultimately, Judge Finney issued a preliminary 
injunction directing the city to refrain from making any more diversions, 
unless the lake levels reached a designated stage, pending a final 
determination. He concluded the lake was in danger of suffering irreparable 
harm. 
The case then went back to the water board for consideration of the city's 
permits. After another two or three months of hearings, the board came up 
with a solution designed to preserve the habitat, prevent dust storms on the 
exposed lake bed, protect the brine shrimp, and maintain the scenic values of 
the lake. It didn't order that the lake be restored to its pre-diversion levels. 
It left some water for Los Angeles. But it directed the city not to take out any 
water until the lake had reached a level of sixteen feet. The board decided that 
in balancing trust interests, the best answer was to raise the lake high enough 
to preserve the gulls, prevent the dust storms, and to enhance the ecological 
and scenic values. 
Los Angeles decided not to appeal this decision. The city felt that it had 
had enough, that the handwriting was on the wall, and that the environmental 
balance must be restored, at least in part, to the basin. 
Since National Audubon, of course, there have been three more occasions 
in which to implement the public trust. The public trust creature has been 
liberated from its historical shackles, as Joe Sax once characterized it, and 
he's appeared in varying forms and guises. I always envisaged the trust as 
something that lurks below the waters of navigable lakes, rivers, and tidelands, 
but obviously, as you can see, it has a great deal of strength today. It has the 
ability to come out of those waters, to close floodgates, and to stop canals and 
diversions hitherto beyond attack. There are a number of ways in which the 
creature has appeared. There are statutes which express the public trust, and 
constitutional provisions as well, which can be characterized as means by 
which the legislature has carried out its duty as trustee. One California statute 
expresses a trust purpose by providing that the use of its water for recreation 
and preservation, for the enhancement of fish and wildlife, is beneficial. 
Another one provides that fish must be kept in good condition below dams and 
other structures. The California appellate court has expressly stated that this 
was a legislative implementation of the public trust doctrine. 
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Other western state courts, including those of Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and 
Washington, have expressly recognized the public trust. The Nevada Court 
indicates it may be willing to, when the time is right, and now, of course, the 
Supreme Court of Hawai'i has applied it to water in the state. Now you face 
the duty of implementing its principles in water allocations, which as Gil 
pointed out, is somewhat more difficult than enunciating those eloquent 
principles in general terms. 
I was struck by the similarities between National Audubon and the 
Waiiihole Ditch decision. I think they go beyond their agreement on their 
legal principles, as important as that may be. Both cases involve the 
reallocation of water from large and costly structures built around the tum of 
the century to accommodate growing needs. In both cases, the court expressed 
a much broader view of the powers of the state, under the public trust 
doctrine, than did the administrative agency charged with administering these 
water rights. And in both cases, a number of parties and amici reflected a sort 
of who's who of all the economic, political, and environmental powers of the 
state. 
What about the world after National Audubon in California? In the first 
place, the dire predictions made by the L.A. Department of Water and Power 
about the adverse impacts on economy and our civilization did not corne true. 
Initially, the city published pamphlets suggesting inner city school children 
would have to go without drinkable water and affordable power if their 
diversions were restricted at all. This did not happen. The city went along 
with the water board's decision, and the decision was more palatable by a 
number of conditions. State funds were made available for water reuse 
programs. The Metropolitan Water District was happy to increase its sales of 
Colorado River water, which, along with state water project water from the 
San Joaquin Delta, goes to Los Angeles to satisfy its needs. It may be that the 
city does not have as firm an expectation of free potable water that it had prior 
to National Audubon, but maybe it never really had a right to that certainty. 
This sense of security was false to begin with, and we can no longer afford it 
today. 
Now, a few cases have arisen since then, and I think the way they were 
handled might be of benefit to you here in Hawai'i. In one case, the court 
decided the case after reference to the water board for an expert opinion and 
recommendation. In another one, the superior court decided the case all by 
itself without the help of the water board, and in the third one, the water board 
itself is attempting to deal with public trust issues. 
[Case descriptions have been omitted.] 
Perhaps this pattern, if not the result, is what we should look at. The 
common law doctrine is somewhat amorphous. While it's powerful, it doesn't 
50 University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 24:21 
really provide a focused directive that can be given by the legislature, which 
in the final analysis, is the trustee for the people of the state. 
What lessons can we learn from California's encounters with the public 
trust? The trust doctrine isn't a cure-all for the resolution of competing water 
uses. It does provide some salutary guidelines and protections for resources 
that were sadly neglected in past allocations of water. It requires a 
consideration of trust values in determining the uses of water, and requires the 
avoidance of harm to those values whenever feasible. It reminds state 
agencies and property rights advocates alike that the state's power and duty 
to protect trust values is a continuing one, and the issuance of a riparian water 
rights permit does not place water beyond the reach of those protections. 
What it does not do is revoke Mark Twain's observation that "while 
whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting over." The long fierce battles 
between water buffalos and tree huggers are going to go on. Cases will last 
for generations, as water rights matters often do. The spirit of Bleak House 
will survive, but a few good results are emerging. First, the legislative and 
administrative agencies have been encouraged or prodded to consider the 
impacts of their actions on public trust values. Second, legislative guidelines 
are emerging. And third, the water rights agencies have slowly begun to 
consider values beyond the ones that they have traditionally followed. All of 
these cases I previously discussed, except the Yuba River one, were settled at 
the trial court or board level, begrudgingly, but nevertheless realistically. The 
public trust, that ancient behemoth, hidden for so long beneath the waters, has 
emerged to confront the water buffalo. His appearance on the field should do 
much to even up what was such an uneven battle in past decades. Thank you. 
JIM PAUL: Thank you very much, Jan. Jan will now tum into the 
commentator for our next panel, which is going to be chaired by Kern Lowry. 
Prof. Kern Lowry, among many other things, is the chair of the Department of 
Urban and Regional Planning. 
KEM LOWRY: Thank you, Jim. We've heard a great deal this morning about 
the public trust as legal doctrine, and our task on this panel is to grapple with 
some of the practical issues associated with implementing the public trust 
doctrine. Planners and resource managers have to grapple with drawing up 
use rules, making plans, making recommendations for regulatory decisions, 
and all those other things that we associate with management. To extend 
Peter's metaphor, it's the planners and the managers who have to line the 
duckies up. So the practical problem for those who are the planners and the 
managers is how is the public trust going to be manifested in the everyday 
work that they do. How is their work going to be different if they take the 
public trust seriously? 
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Joining me on the panel are five or six people who are directly involved in 
management, incorporating the public trust in management decisions, or 
whose management work is affected by public trust decisions. From the far 
end, we have Charlene Hoe, who is the Executive Director of the Strategic 
Planning Section of Kamehameha Schools. And Jan Stevens is joining us. 
And Colin Kippen, who is the Deputy Administrator of the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs. Next to him is Senator Colleen Hanabusa from the twenty-
first district and also Vice President of the Senate. Bill, the Director, 
Department of Land and Natural Resources, Division of Aquatic Resources. 
And Chris Yuen, who is the Big Island Planning Director. We've invited each 
of the panelists to make a short introductory statement that summarizes the 
key points in their paper, and then we'll go straight to the questions from that. 
So with that in mind, I'm going to start this time at this end. I'll ask you, 
Chris, if you would begin. 
CHRIS YUEN: Good morning and aloha everyone. I'm impressed that so 
many people have taken their Saturday morning off to talk about this 
important topic. People often discuss that you have a distinguished panel. I 
want to recognize that we have a very distinguished audience, including 
people that were directly involved in the Waiiihole decision as public 
advocates, attorneys, members of the commission, and decision-makers. We 
have many people in the community who have worked hard on water issues 
without recognition or compensation for many, many years. And I also want 
to say aloha to many members of the DLNR who deal with these kinds of 
issues on a daily basis and are responsible for a lot of the day-to-day 
management of the things we have been talking about here this morning. 
I'm not going to talk about water very much. We've heard a lot about water 
this morning. I could give a long explanation, and it's always useful to talk 
about where you're coming from and your background, and I could spend a 
long time talking about my transition from environmental activist to 
government bureaucrat with a stop as an attorney along the way. I have to 
confess that, but I guess to take one fact from my background, I grew up in 
Hilo. As a result, it's hard for me to completely relate to the idea of the 
scarcity of water. We have 135 inches of rain! I grew up by a stream, 
Honali'i Stream, where I, as a youth, enjoyed in stream benefits and made 
beneficial use of the stream flow. Today we recognize many species of O'opu 
as an endangered species. As I grew up, we young fellows in the neighborhood 
recognized it as a delightful thing to spear and eat, and certainly we won't do 
that anymore, but I thought I would talk about something a little bit different 
than just water. 
The question came up in the earlier panel, what are the implications of the 
public trust doctrine for other natural resources? I started off my paper by 
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quoting from the Hawai'i State Constitution, which says that "all public 
natural resources are a public trust." Now I want to say something right at the 
outset about this. The public trust doctrine, as discussed here today, and as 
discussed by Prof. Sax and in the Waiiihole water decision, is not going to be 
imported wholesale into all public natural resources. I'm going to talk in just 
a minute about what are public natural resources. As we talk about what those 
are, you'll see that there are many aspects of water law that don't apply, that 
are not going to apply. But I wanted to discuss this morning as a way of 
reminding us and reminding those of us who are responsible in some more 
direct way for the stewardship of those resources that yes, our state 
constitution says that those are something to be held in trust. I think that the 
overall direction that is being given to us by the Waiiihole decision is that the 
long-term health of those resources is what we must put first when we're 
making the hard decisions that we have to make. 
Public natural resources, what are they? Let's start with the things that 
everybody would agree with. Air, that's a big one. Bill is in charge of aquatic 
resources, fish, wildlife, wild animals that live around us, not so wild 
sometimes, public lands, lands owned by the people of Hawai'i, geothermal 
energy. Another big one, the sea and the seabed, insofar as they are under 
state jurisdiction and insofar as the state has control of them. The big areas. 
How is this going to be a legal handle? My role as a planning director is to try 
to guide our decision-makers in our county so that they don't make mistakes 
that have to be undone some day by the courts. I think that a lot of law, a lot 
of legal decisions, are made as a result of public decision-makers making 
decisions that are, that do need to be undone and law is made in those 
respects, but the first line of action is the people that make the decisions in the 
first place and we need to make those in a very, very careful way. When I 
started working, one thing I told my staff, as a guiding principle we were 
going to go by, is something that's· taught to carpenters, "measure twice, cut 
once." Take a good hard look at what you're doing. Take a hard look at it 
again before you make a decision that can't be undone. What are the areas 
that may be public natural resources that are not so obvious? I spoke earlier 
about public lands. Well, what about it? This is a tie-in to water, we've 
talked about water being a public trust resource. Our groundwater here and 
on all the islands depends on upland water recharge-the mauka lands. Much 
of this, fortunately, is in public ownership. It behooves us as managers of that 
public land to look at those aspects of managing those lands and seeing that 
those are managed properly for recharge. But there are also private lands. To 
what extent are private lands, upon which water recharge is dependent, upon 
which the aquifers depend, to what extent are those impressed with some kind 
of public trust for that purpose? And just to finish, and on the areas that are 
specifically in my paper, where I think that the court may some day step in one 
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of these areas outside of the water and say a mistake has been made is in the 
area of automatic approval. The state legislature in 1998 passed a law that 
essentially says that all business and development related permits, including 
those that are involved in land use, environmental regulation and the like, can 
be automatically approved if the governmental body does not act upon them 
within a set period of time. And thinking about the bodies that make these 
decisions, whether it's BLNR, our own Planning Commission, the Land Use 
Commission, the most likely way for there to be a really stupid decision 
coming out of one of these bodies is if they happen to blow the timeframe at 
some point and enact something by an automatic approval. And I would 
suggest that, some day, if a particularly egregious and damaging decision is 
made by virtue of an automatic approval, the courts may come in and say that 
the natural resource that is being jeopardized by that decision is a public trust 
and, like Illinois Central, like these other public trust cases, step in and 
reverse that. There are a couple of things I'd like to say and I'll entertain 
questions about. I just want to say, if I could just say one more thing on a 
theme, and I want to say this to try to explain to those of you in the public why 
sometimes people like myself who have jobs now in the government don't do 
what we ought to do or don't do as good ajob as we should do, and you have 
to, we do a much better job at regulation than management. 
In the Waiiihole water case, it was very important, and there was a question, 
is that something that was worth the effort? I think no doubt it was worth the 
effort, but in the Waiiihole water case you had maybe fifteen attorneys in the 
room, you had commissioners, you had transcribers, you had some of the 
brightest people in the state, maybe twenty-five people in the state in a room 
discussing the allocation of water. All that water depends upon recharge from 
upland forests. Folks, you don't have twenty to twenty-five people out there 
working on those upland forests, fixing the fences, making sure that alien 
plants don't spread in the forest. We need to do a much better job in active 
management. 
KEM LOWRY: Thanks. Okay, Bill. 
BILL DEVICK: I need to start with a disclaimer: I am not a lawyer. As such, 
I don't want to keep my thinking bound by legal principle. I look at the public 
trust, and I see a tool that should be interpreted in the broadest possible sense. 
If we look at what decision making has done in the past, things have really 
gotten rather messed up. If we look at fisheries, they've collapsed. If we look 
at what's happening in streams, we've got lots of problems. If we look at the 
land, we have serious problems. Why has this happened? It's because 
decision-making has largely been focused on economic interests. I see public 
trust as both a philosophy and a potential tool to shift that thinking, to shift the 
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balance in decision-making towards protection and conservation, thinking 
about the future, rather than simple immediate, economic advantage. 
Obviously, we'd like to have this, and obviously it's much easier said than 
done. One thing that is seriously lacking in achieving this level of 
consideration is good science, a good understanding of what it is that we're 
dealing with. There is the precautionary principle, which is frequently 
associated with public trust, and it can be used at least by some people as an 
excuse to not collect the information. If we don't know, that becomes an 
argument for not making a decision, especially towards protection or 
conservation. So, we need the science. If we don't have that, if we don't have 
the good information, in terms of what we want to see, we simply fall back to 
the precautionary principal, and we're going to make the lawyers on the first 
panel very happy. They're going to have lots of work, and we're not going to 
get what we want. 
KEM LOWRY: Thank you. 
COLLEEN HANABUSA: I guess on the panel I'm one of those who you look 
to have something wise to say about where the legislature is going to go 
because, after all, we are deemed to be the state and the trustees of the public 
trust doctrine. All I have to say is that the reason why you do not have the 
kind of legislation that many are looking for is because of the fact that you 
have so many types of views, a lot of them conflicting, that have to be 
balanced, and we do not, we the legislature, do not balance that well at all. 
The Waiiihole decision is very significant to me, not so much as an attorney 
but as a lawmaker, because of certain things that the Supreme Court said that 
I think will impact how we look at the public trust doctrine, how we look at 
the whole area of water rights into the future. And that is, I think, best stated 
by the dissent of Justice Ramil when he pointed out that, in his opinion, the 
majority trumped the water code by this nebulous common law doctrine called 
the public trust. And, of course, he was in the minority, but what it does tell 
us is that, in fact, the Supreme Court of Hawai 'i has now actively interjected 
themselves in a way that I don't believe that they have in the past. They are 
saying that they are the ultimate entity that will determine whether or not we, 
the state, have fulfilled our public trust in terms of the natural resources, not 
only constitutionally mandated, but also mandated in common law principle. 
What it tells us in the legislature is, as the court did say in the majority, that 
we are unable to abdicate our trust responsibilities, whether it is by way of the 
water code or even the water commission, that, in my opinion, were 
established constitutionally by the people in the constitutional amendment. 
But what does this then mean in terms of the legislature? Weare undisputedly 
the trustees, but what does that then mean for us in terms of how we then 
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exercise the issue of the public trust and the management of this resource? 
And I will tell you I don't know whether the legislature as an entity has any 
idea as to how it will do it. It will continue to basically abdicate it, I believe, 
to the Water Commission as the entity that should be making those decisions, 
and it will continue to be lobbied by all of the varying interest groups to 
change that water code, which every<me will feel somehow affects how this 
necessary natural resource is managed, and the result will be probably what 
you all have seen. Many of your faces are very familiar because you're in our 
offices on various sides of various issues, and you know that for the most part 
what happens is practically nothing. And let me give you an example. How 
many of you know what LISA is? I mean, it's a constitutional requirement, 
and basically nothing has happened, and every time there's a move towards 
LISA, there's a movement against it, and what's really interesting is that many 
times, that move is done by both sides, what we would consider both sides of 
the issue. Both environmentalists don't want it done in a certain way, and the 
people who represent development, they don't want it touched. So we end up 
almost with status quo at every juncture, and we're almost at, what it seems 
to me, is that we have sort of an artificial balance here, and it isn't until one 
group is going to push that the other group is going to react. Let me give you 
another example. We all know PASH, the infamous PASH decision, gathering 
rights, native Hawaiian rights. If you ever come to a situation where people 
want to start to talk about, "Let's codify, let's do something about it." You'd 
be fascinated to know, you'd have people from both sides of that issue saying 
"Let it be." We think it's working because no one wants anyone else to get 
a one-upmanship on it. This legislature is going to probably continue that way 
as long as the people that are represented maintain that. When that balance 
shifts by the electorate's choices and whatever party preference or whatever 
the elections may be, I will predict that there will be a shift in that balance. At 
that point in time, my estimate will be that you'd probably have more lawsuits 
filed, and it will be filed under the public trust doctrine because that resource, 
and as you see the sentiments of the communities today, and especially in 
these economic times and the events of September 11 th, I believe you will find 
more and more of these types of decisions made with the short, immediate 
future in mind, and for that, you will have sacrifices made, in terms of what 
people would like to say are the public trust and the future. 
People are looking more to what is immediate and even saying, if there isn't 
an answer for the immediate, how can you look for the future, what are you 
preserving it for? So these are the kinds of issues that the legislature is going 
to be faced with, and unfortunately, I believe that the concept of the public 
trust in the near immediate future will be fine if we can just keep it in the 
balance that it is in now. Thank you. 
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KEM LOWRY: Colin. 
COLIN KIPPEN: Aloha. We were asked to not so much focus our energies 
on what the decision itself says in terms of the doctrine. We've heard about 
it, and from my perspective, this is a seminal case. It is a case that, for 
someone who is a Hawaiian rights advocate, is long overdue, but all it does, 
in my opinion, is say something we all knew already existed. If you look at 
the materials I prepared, I began with a very simple statement, and it was this, 
"Without a resource, you can have no practice." For me, Waiiihole represents 
an opinion which basically says that we will care about the protection of the 
resources. In my paper that I presented, I go on and talk about some of the 
doctrine, some of the rules that are in the case, and I guess the fundamental 
things that I think have changed, and for all of you who are planners or who 
are bureaucrats or who are people who are deeply concerned about how we're 
going to meet this objective, the basic thing that has changed is what we have 
said, that those who make decisions about water are trustees. There is a 
picture in that case, and I'm a person that loves pictures, and the picture is a 
picture of an umpire. And if you read the case, it talks about how people who 
make these decisions, trustees, must not merely be umpires passively calling 
balls and strikes. Now Barry Bonds just hit seventy two, and I know that 
many of you here probably, in fact let me just see a show of hands. How 
many of you here play softball? You know, I got to say that you folks really 
need to spend more time on recreation . 
. The problem when you're playing softball, particularly if you're playing as 
an adult, which I love to do, and I don't do it as much because my knees are 
long gone, but the problem with playing softball is that they only give you one 
umpire when you're an adult playing in a makuli game. And when you're in 
the makuli league playing softball, that umpire's positioned behind the batter. 
And there might be a play at second base, and I want you to just imagine for 
a second a rather portly umpire standing behind the batter, and there's a steal 
on, and the guy runs to second base, and the umpire, looking through the 
pitcher, calls the play at second base. It's a close play; the throw was from the 
outfield. It is behind the second baseman, because he's looking from the 
outfield receiving the throw, and that umpire standing at home plate takes not 
one step to move out into the field to be able to see what's going on. For me, 
when I read that language in the opinion, you know, I've had some 
experiences with that situation, where the umpire is cemented into the ground 
and is not doing the things that he or she needs to do, which is to get out there, 
into the field. And see what's going on, ask the questions, get the data, do the 
analysis, and form a conclusion. Now, we know that science is evolving. We 
know that what we will know tomorrow will not nearly match what we knew 
yesterday, and it is that way with science. But this case says if you don't 
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know, then you need to adopt some precautionary principles which protect the 
resource. You can read all about that in what I've basically written, because 
it's there. I don't want to take any more time, but if you just remember that 
one principle. No more are we going to stand for umpires cemented behind 
home plate. They are going to have to get out there, ask the questions, and 
they are going to have to make decisions. I wasn't really going to talk about 
this, but Senator Hanabusa, you made just such a perfect segue for what I want 
to say now. I work for the Office of Hawaiian affairs, and everything that I've 
said is my own opinion, but imagine public trustees that are elected. What 
does that mean? Senator Hanabusa, I think, tried to indicate that you have 
your constituencies, and you have your political issues that need to be 
resolved, you have the need to have yourself elected in two years if you're a 
representative or four years if you happen to be in the Senate. How does that 
body go about implementing the public trust, one which is long-term and not 
short-term? I could write volumes about how that structure can lead to some 
very interesting situations at the Office of Hawaiian Mfairs. And a lot of it 
is structural, but the legislature has a role to play here, and I see the role that 
the legislature has to play, that it has to provide the resources, the resources 
for those people to go out and to be able to do the studies that are necessary 
to make the decisions. How many planning departments have biologists on 
their staffs? You know, those are the kinds of questions we need to be asking. 
How many of them really have people who are cultural experts, so that they 
can define what it is that practice is, so that they can define how it is that we 
need to protect it? 
I conclude my paper with something that all of us know whether you are 
Kama' aina, you are malihini, whoever you are, you are on this island, you live 
on islands, and you have a responsibility to maiama 'aina. And, for me, the 
thing that this case represents, it is just another case in a developing doctrine 
that our supreme court has embraced, and it is this: that we must maZama 
'aina, that we must protect the land and the water, and we must protect the 
rights of those people to be able to practice their traditional and customary 
ways with respect to that resource. 
KEM LOWRY: Thanks Colin. Charlene? 
CHARLENE HOE: I'm here on behalf of myself and not on behalf of 
Kamehameha. The question of why am I here was one that I had in the very 
beginning. Perhaps it has to do with my job not as administrator of a 
governmental office or as a regulator on any level but simply as a citizen. I 
came to the issue of caring for water resources back in the earlier 1970s, and 
I came to it being much younger and much more naive than I am at this 
particular moment in time, so I looked to our state constitution for guidance. 
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To me, it was quite clear that we were to take care of our natural resources 
and, of course, that would include water as a primary resource. I was 
concerned about it because our family was trying to reopen some 10 'i that had 
gone into remission for a period of time as the older generation passed away 
and the younger generation had yet to take up its mantle to malama the 'aina. 
And as we tried to do that, tried to access our appurtenant rights that came 
with the land and tend the 10 'i, we found that the stream that had forever 
previous to that time in the experience of our family been perpetually running 
fully sufficient to feed all of the 10 'i in our particular area was nearly dry. 
Water was being diverted mauka. We needed to find a way to restore water 
to the stream. So we did our research, we went to all of those agencies, all of 
those people that we thought were the caretakers of that resource and asked 
them for assistance. Can you help us find the cause? Can you help us find the 
solution? To the person, and this was at the county, at the state, and at the 
federal level, we were told, "It's not our kuleana, it's not our business, and 
furthermore, it's not really a big problem. It's just you folks in that particular 
little community." 
Well, we didn't quite believe that, and so our particular community said 
well, let's go ask. Let's go statewide and see if our problem is just unique to 
our ahupua'a, or is it broader than that. We actually took up our family, and 
I say "we" because whatever we've done on these issues over the years, we've 
taken individual personal responsibility to do it, but we've never done it alone. 
It's always been multiple people coming together with positive energies to 
find solutions, rather than reasons why we cannot do problem solving. So, a 
group of people within our communities bundled up our families in our 
jalopies, sent our trucks to the neighbor islands, and literally went community 
to community asking, "Are you folks having water problems and what are 
those water problems?" We went from Kauai to Molokai, Maui, the Big 
Island, all around, and everyone that we visited had water problems. No one 
to that point had really said okay, what can we maybe do about it. As we 
started talking collectively statewide, one of the ideas that came to us was that 
maybe we could start with our own state constitution. Maybe we could look 
at the wording that said, take care of our water and natural resources, and 
make it a little bit stronger, a little bit clearer, to state that not only do we 
collectively have a responsibility, but also that our government, of which we 
are a part, has the responsibility to take the lead, and has the responsibility to 
set aside resources, both human and financial, to take that task on directly. 
I ended up being the person with the short straw and was sent off to the 
Constitutional Convention in 1978 and became part of an effort, and I mean 
a very small part of a very broad effort statewide, to try to make the 
constitutional language clearer so that we could, in fact, have something to go 
to, some forum to go to, where more than just the economic voice prevailed, 
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which from our perspective at that point, seemed to be the only voice at the 
table in making decisions relative to the use and care of water resources. We 
felt it imperative to provide a forum where more voices could be at the table 
to look to the long-term care of our water resources, to look to the perpetuity 
of the health for that resource, not just how to make a dollar today in this time 
and in this generation. I think we have before us an imperfect vehicle with our 
water code, and I think we are in the process, collectively as a broad 
community, of having an ongoing dialogue of how do we best take care of our 
resource. It's not going to be resolved by one act. 
The Waiiihole decision is a very important decision, as I would agree with 
Colin to my left, and it provides a very important step forward, that we need 
to be actively supporting and working toward resolutions, but I also agree that 
there are multiple needs to balance, and the question is how do we do that 
with an eye to forever, not just for today, but with an eye to forever? It takes 
leadership, yes, from our legislature, but maybe more importantly, from all of 
us. 
I think that I have strong faith in many minds coming together to look for 
resolution. After serving in the Constitutional Convention and being much 
more naive, my hopes were, okay, the Constitution says we're going to have 
this entity, we're going to create this forum, we're going to have a water code, 
that would happen quickly and instantaneously, and we would have a chance 
to have a voice. As you know, it took nearly ten years to define what the 
water code would actually be, and how we would get a water commission. All 
of those balances, all of those competing voices were part of the dialogue for 
nearly ten years. Through the course of that, though, I think there was 
agreement on the need to care for the resource in perpetuity. To me, that's the 
hope; that common ground there, is the hope. 
KEM LOWRY: Anyone want to say anything uplifting? I want to thank the 
panel. Prof. Sax, if you would be so kind to try to sum up for us perhaps in 
ten minutes. 
PROFESSOR SAX: Well, the panel ended with the question, does anyone 
want to say anything uplifting? I'll volunteer. First, I think you're very 
fortunate in your human resources. I was amazed at the depth of knowledge, 
the commitment, the energy that was expressed by the various people from 
this state who have been on the two panels we heard. I think it's 
extraordinary, and you should feel very good about that. It seems to me that's 
a very positive sign, and I don't think there are very many places that you'd 
be able to put together panels like that. 
Let me add a few words about what I would take home from what I heard 
today. I thought the point that the public tnist is a philosophy and a tool was 
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just right on the mark. I think that's exactly right. I think it creates an 
opportunity to revise priorities, to utilize good science and to turn things 
around from the way they've traditionally been done so that, in the planning 
process, in the management and administrative processes that are going to go 
on, resources will be looked aF fIrst, and they'll be looked at in the context of 
good data about what the potential losses and potential opportunities are. 
I also want to say something about a question that was raised: Does a court, 
as a result of a decision like this arrogate to itself authority as against the 
legislature? I think if you handle things right, that's not the case at all. I hope 
you picked up some of this from what Jan Stevens said. The importance of 
having a court that has a strong commitment to such a doctrine and a 
willingness in an energetic way to see that it's enforced is this. If things work 
right, it empowers the legislature to move forward, let's say it pushes the 
legislature to move forward on some agenda items that otherwise would not 
have received adequate attention. It energizes administrative agencies to act, 
and it stands ready in the background to make sure that they do their jobs. So 
the court is there, if you play it right, to help you get the job done and to create 
some incentives to move in ways that you haven't been able to do before. But 
you've got to take advantage of that opportunity. 
I want to say something also about the fact that comments were frequently 
. made about water controversies that go on and on and on and are endless. 
Again, if you listened carefully to what Jan was saying, and to the examples 
that he gave, he indicated that the experience in California has basically been 
that the potential of having endless litigation has induced people to sit down 
and to try to work out solutions. In most of these cases, we have worked out 
solutions that don't give anybody all that they want, but generate a resolution 
that's acceptable to everybody, and gives to resources a great deal more than 
they've had traditionally. I think that that's a very positive experience and one 
that you might want to look to for some potential guidance. 
Another point that Jan made that I would also emphasize is that, in the 
aftermath of the Mono Lake case, which was viewed as a very radical decision 
by a court that had stepped outside of its ordinary role, there was a lot of talk 
about collapse and catastrophe, that nothing could be built anymore, that 
people would not get water, that food would not be available, and every other 
bad thing that you can think of. But as you can see, we're still more or less in 
business. Things haven't collapsed and people have responded in a positive 
way, and that's something to be encouraged about. 
On a legal point that arose on the fIrst panel, that is, concerns that were 
expressed about whether the public trust interpretation you have is the taking 
of property. I want to say a brief word about that. These are questions that 
will eventually fInd their way to the U.S. Supreme Court. My own 
observation is that the critical issue the U.S. Supreme Court will want to look 
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at is: what is the state law? The Court has been traditionally very deferential 
to states' interpretation of their own law . You heard J an and me refer to states 
like Montana, Idaho, and Arizona. You heard one of the panelists refer to 
Maine and New York. The reason we referred to different states is that Maine 
and New York are states that have taken a very narrow view of the public 
trust. Hawai 'i and others take a broad view of the public trust. I think you can 
expect the Supreme Court of the United States to follow where the states go, 
so states that have taken a narrow view are likely to have a much more limited 
public trust and stronger private rights in water. Another question that's 
important is whether the Court ultimately will take the view that these are 
rights and commitments, obligations that have in fact been a part of your law 
for a long time going way back, or whether they are very new ideas, that either 
the state court itself innovated or that came only at the time of your most 
recent constitution, which was 1978. 
Those are the questions to which I don't know the answer, but those will be 
the critical questions. In many circumstances, the state courts will say, here 
is a provision in recent law, but in fact the recent law is simply an affirmation 
by the legislature or by a constitutional convention of something that had been 
accepted principles of law in the state for a long, long time. I think this is one 
question that will undoubtedly arise in the Hawaiian situation if your public 
trust doctrine is challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Finally, I want to say that the public trust doctrine is a very important 
potential tool. It's not a cure-all, it isn't going to solve all of your resource 
problems, but it is an important and valuable tool as long as it's used right. 
As someone who's worked on environmental issues now for forty years, I 
want to say you are not going to solve all of your problems. This is a world 
of never-ending struggle. It just goes on and on and on, and you don't move 
forward as rapidly as you like. But if you're moving forward, even if you'd 
like to go by miles but you're actually going by inches, at least you're moving 
forward. As long as you keep at it, you know eventually you'll get there. The 
fact of the matter is that there never is enough money and everyone has that 
problem. And there are always powerful forces with projects that want to 
misuse resources. You have to face up to that reality and you work against it. 
Now you've got some newly recognized and powerful tools to help you. You 
also have a lot of knowledgeable and committed people to work on it. From 
across the water, we wish you good luck. 
